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Case No. 9141
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAI-I

BEATRICE J. BOYLE, now Beatrice
.J. Boyle Wynes,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v~.

GLEN A. BAGGS and FREDDIE BAGGS,
his wife,
Respondents and Claimants.

STATEl\1:ENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court
granting the 1fotion of the Respondents, Glen A. Baggs
and Freddie Baggs, to dismiss the appellant's complaint
"because the same does not state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." The entire file, Beatrice .J. Boyle
vs. George A. Boyle, Jr., District Court in and for
Weber County, Utah, file No. 22 901 has be·en designated a~ the record on appeal.
Th'e -plaintiff and appellant, Beatrice J. Boyle
Wynes, filed her action seeking a divorce from George
A. Boyle, Jr., and the following statement of facts
chronologically ~et out should aid in an understanding
of the history of the Boyle vs. Boyle case as it affects
the appellant and respondent. References are to page
number in Boyle vs. Boyle.
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1948 - Decree of Divorce entered providing for
the monthly installments of support 1noney
for a minor child at $40.00 per 1nonth to
begin with ~larch, 1948. Page 6.
1949 - Decree modified lowering the support
pay1nents to $25.00 per 1nonth. -:\[ inute
Entry Page 10, Order Page 17.
1950 - Plaintiff filed Affidavit, Page 11, alleging
a delinquency and Order entered directing
that the defendant Boyle pay $30.00 per
month, $5.00 per month to apply on the
delinquency, Page 17. (See allegation No.
4, of plaintiffs Petition.)
1952 - Child adopted in August of this year by
plaintiff's new husband and obligation on
Boyle to pay support n1oney C'eased. Page
23.
1952 - Support su1ns accrued and owing and unpaid total the sum of $987.00 (S_ee sworn
testimony of plaintiff in deposition before
Oom1nission showing delinquency accruing
$197.50 for 1948; $450.00 for 1949; $270.50
for 1950; $300.00 for 1951 ; and $175.00 for
1952.) Page 31 (See also paragraph~ 9
and 10 of plaintiff's Petition)
1954 - August 4, property acquired by defendant
Boyle. ( Se paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's
Petition.)
1955 - Septe1nber 19, 1955, George A. Boyle, Jr.,
h~· deed conveyed his interest in the real
property to the respondents, Glen A.
Baggs and Freddie Baggs. See allegations
of paragraph 6 of plai-ntiff's Petition.
1955 - December 29, Petition alleging delinquency filed by plaintiff praying for judgInent in the smn of $987.00. Pages ~~-~:~24. (See paragraph 7 of plaintiff's Petition.
2
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That hy subsequent transfers of the interest in said
real propert~· there cmne into the hands of a real estate
broker, funds whirh hy stipulation were deposited with
Lawrence M . .Malan, Clerk of the above-named Court,
awaiting distribution according to the validity of the
claim~ 1nade hy the plaintiff and appellant and clailnants and I'Pf-ipondenh; to said funds.
The defendant, George Boyle, Jr., has no claim to
funds and is not a party to or concerned with this
appeal and Henry C. Wolfe and Yvonne Wolfe, listed
as claimants, have on stipulation been dismissed as
claimantf-i in this proceeding.
~aid

'J.1he plaintiff and appellant claims the funds under
the provision of the divorce decree awarding monthly
support moneys and the lien existing for delinquent and
unpaid support money due as of the time the defendant
George A. Boyle, .Jr., acquired an interest in said real
property in 1954. The funds being held came from the
sale of the equity the said Glenn A. Baggs and Freddie
Baggs had acquired in said real property and are claimed
by them for this reason.
Th'ere being no other claimants to said funds the
order granting the claimants and respondents Motion
to dis1niss is a final order fully determinative of the
plaintiff's claim to said funds.
The parties to the appeal have stipulated as follows:
1. The record on appeal.

2. Waiver of bond on appeal.
3. Waiver of award of costs on appeal.
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

1. Granting of Motion to Dismiss was in error.
3
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2. A Decree of the District Court ordering payments
in the future of monthly sums as alimony and support
money automatically establishes a lien as each payment
accrues and is unpaid.
3. Notice to the defendant buyers was adequate
to put them on a duty of inquiry.
ARGU~1ENT

POINT 1.
GRANTING OF J\10TION TO DISl\IISS WAS IN
ERROR.
The plaintiff and appellant's petition for an Order
directing delivery of the funds to her is in the file constituting the record on appeal and contains 13 alleging
paragraphs and 5 paragraphs in the prayer. Boyle vs.
Boyle, file pages 36, 37, and 38. Rule 8A sets out the
requirements of a complaint as follows:
"1. A short and plain state1nent of the claims
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
"2. A demand for judgment for the reli'ef to
which he deems hinu;elf entitled."
Rule 8E (1) (URCP Page 488) provides that each avertlnent of a pleading shall he sin1ple, concise and direct.
That no technical fonns of pleading or 1notion are required.
This Court has been called upon to decide upon the
sufficiency of a complaint under the rules in several
cases. Smne of these are referred to in the case of
Blackhan1 vs. Snelgrove, 280 Pacific ~. 453, 3 Utah 2,
1957, which involved an:
''Appeal from an order of dis1nissal for failure of plaintiff's cmnplaint to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted ..,
4
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In this ea~P H(•wdt was charged with a felony and
Blaekhmn dPpo:.;ited with the Clerk of the Court $1,000.00
ea~li hail.
Upon the dismis~ml of the erin1inal charge
Hlad;lmm denmnded tlH• money which the Clerk refused
to give hint. Blackhan1 then brought suit, the defendant
1
( 1Prk filed a Motion to Dis1niss and the Court granted
the order of Dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to state
a clai1n upon which relief can be grounded. 'rhe record
doe~ not show the basis on which the trial court found
the plaintiff's cmnplaint def1ective, hut on appeal it was
claimed that the Order granting the ?\lotion to Dismiss
wa~ based upon the plaintiff's failure to allege himself
the owner of the nwney deposited as cashbail. The Court
then con~iders the following rules: 12B ( 6) which permits the dismissal of a case for failure of the pleading to
state a clain1 upon which relief can be granted. Rule
SA sets out what the con1plaint must contain in order
to state the clai1n for relief:
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief * * * shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the clailn showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and (:3) a demand for judglnent."
Rule SE ( 1) provides no technical form of pleadings or
1notions are required and Rule SF states all pleadings
shall be so ronstrued as to do substantial justice.
The Court in its opinion in the Blackham vs.
Snelgrove case refers to the Federal Rules and points
up the very substantial change that has taken place
under the new pre-trial discovery mechanis1n established
by Rules 26 to 37, pointing out that before these rules
were enacted the drafting of the issues and pleadings
were very important to try and fix the issues. The new
5
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rules however, restrict the pleadings to the task of
general notice giving and invest the deposition discovery
process with the vital role in the preparation for trial.
. At Page 455, the Court states:
"Thus it can ve~y often he found stated in
these cases that a complaint is only required to
' * * * give the opposing party fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of a claim and a
general indiPation of- the type of litigation involved.' ''
It can also frequently he found stated in these cases
that a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless
it app'ears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could
be proved in support of the claim.
The reasoning behind these federal court cases is
well summed up in LEIMER vs. STATE :MUTUAL
INSURANCE COl\IPANY, 8 Cir, 1940, 108 Federal 2d,
302 at page 30G.
''ln vif'w of the 1neans which the Rules of
( iiviJ Procedure afford a defendant to obtain a

speedy disposition of a clailn which was without
foundation or substance either by securing a 1nore
definite staten1ent or bill of particulars under
Rule 1~ ( P) and thereafter applying for on the
pleadings under Rule 12 (h) (1), or by nwving
for a summary judgn1ent under Hule ;){), we think
ther'e is no justification for dis1nissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except
where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would be entitled to no relief under anv state of
facts which eould be proved in suppo.rt of the
claim."
The Court then directed a reversal of the Dish·iet
Court's Order dismissing the complaint.
6
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In the case of LIQUOR CONTROL COMl\IISSION
vs. ATHAS, 243 P2, 441, the liquor commission sued
Athas and Lack for an account of the proceeds and conversion of the value of liquor sold by the defendants
after the plaintiff's delivery to thein at their drug store
under a liquor package agency. The District Court disInissed the Cmnmission's coinplaint for failure to state
a clai1n upon which relief could be granted and also for
failure to furnish a 1nore definite statement as ordered
by the Court pursuant to Rule 12 E. rrhis court held
that the cmnplaint did state a cause of action.
Plaintiff and appellant therefore respectfully contend~ that her 13 paragraph petition does constitute a
c·ause of action entitling her to the funds now held by
the Clerk of the District Court and that the granting of
the l\[otion to Dismi~s \vas error.
POINT 2.
A DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT ORDERING PAYl\IE-NTS IN THE FUTURE OF
NIONTHL Y SUl\fS AS ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
l\IONEY AUTONIATICALLY ESTABLISHES A
LIEN AS EACH PAYl\fENT ACCRUES AND IS UNPAID.
1,he original briefs are in the file designated
Record on Appeal but since the plaintiff and appellant's is a reply brief it is appropriate to present her
authorities and argum ents as an appellant and this accordingly has been done.
Our Supreme Court has considered two cases which
bear on th'e question to be resolved, namely:
BEESLEY vs. BADGER, 66 Utah 194; 240 Pacific 458
1

7
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OPENSHAW vs. OPENSHAW, 105 Utah 574;
144 Pacific 2 528
At least five situations exist under various support
money Decrees and at the outset the distinction between
them should be made :
1. A decree providing for payment of future installments without any installment being delinquent.
In such a case no lien exists.
2. A decree providing for payment of future installments where there are accrued and unpaid
installments.
3. A subsequent or second judgment entered after
the original divorce decree for past du'e installments.
4. Lump sum award.
5. A Decree specifically providing that the judgnlent is a lien.
'rhe law in the Beesley ease and n1ost other authorities
establishes a lien in all of the last three situations. See
Beesley case at Page 460.
No lien exists where no sums are due which covers
the first situation.
The second situation is the one 1n focus 1n this
appeal.
The Beesley ea~e (supra) at Page 460 in the left
column in the top 1 j3 of the page discusses the various
kinds of ~upport n1oney decrees, then ~tates:
"When no such lien is declared or ilnpressed by
the Court, itself, we, from the texts and the case.s
there cited, and frmn the statute, deduce and declare this to be the rule: \Vhen a divorce is
8
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granted and the hu~hand ordered to pay alilnony
or to ~npport minor children or both, and the
DP<'I'PP itself do<>~ not declare or i1npress a lien
to ~P<·ure such pay1nents then, by force of the
s/atulc ,relatinq to .f~td,qnunts in geueral, suclz
rlecrel' or j"d.fJIII<'nl from the fdinq and docketing
thereof /)('Comes and has all the force and effect
of a lieu to the .'·:ame extent as an ordinary judg111<'111 for JJIOIIf',IJ, when the dPcrcr for alimony is
in a gro~~ ~ann, though payable partly or wholly
in future in~tallments, and when not in gross
smn, but, as here, in ius/aliments for an ,indefinite
]J('riod, the derrce is a lien securinq payment of
all d1te aHd u n JHtid installments, hut not of installment:; to becorne due in the future. By weight
of authority, and as we think the better reason,
although th'ere are cases to the contrary, a decree
for alimo11.1J in a gross sum as u~<'ll as to past d1tc
a Jirl un JWid install m cnts stands upon the smne
footin,fl as an ordinary money judgment and 1nay
be enforc<'rl by e.r<'cut,ion in the same manner as
onlinar_11 money judgments may be enforced.
'" "' "" ~ A judgnr'ent or deeree awarding alilnony
in a gross sum, though payable in future installmenb, i:-; neverthele~s definite and certain as to
the stun of nroney to he paid. So is a decree as
to past-due instalhnents. In such instances the
amount du'e and to be paid to discharge the lien
i~ certain and definite, and, if sought to be enforced by execution, the anrount due and unpaid
can be stated in the writ of execution." (italics
ours).
The Court in the Openshaw case (supra) refers to the
Bee~ley case at Page :>:30, paragraph 6 and 7 at the
middle of the right cohnnn:
''In Bee~·dey vs. Badger, 66 Utah 194; 240 P 458,
we stated that a decree for the payment of ali9
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mony op'erates as a judgment lien as to all past
due and unpaid installments. Execution may
therefore issue for the arrearage accumulated
within a period of eight years."
The Court further states in the first paragraph in the
right column of Page 530 as follows:
"That the right of the trial court to modify an
alimony or support money award does not extend to installments which have already accrued
and which are past due, because the right to
collect such installment~ becomes vested upon the
due date."
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 Section 30-4-3 provides
that the Court may by Order and Decree "provide how
and when payments shall be made and that the wife
shall have a lien upon the property of the husband to
secure payment of th'e smne."
Section 78-22-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is the
succeeding Section to Section 68 Laws of Utah, referred
to in the Beesley case, supra. See the middle of the right
column page 459 and recites that a judgment is a lien
from the time it is docketed. Also Section 69-12 and
Section 69-13, Laws of Utah, 1917, as referred to at the
right column at the 1niddle of page 459, becanw our Rule
69 and recites that the party in whose favor judg1nent
is given may within any tiine within eight years have
execution issue for the enforcem(lnt of the judgment.
But nothing is said in any of these Section~ that
any proceeding ne·ed be taken by the plaintiff subsequent
to the original ;judgn1ent to have the Court decide what
sum is now due and unpaid under the judgment. But
requires only that the amount actually due thereon must
be stated in the writ of exerution.
10
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The judg1ncnt creditor in an ordinary money judgment does not have to go hack into Court and recite the
interPst which has accrued and the payments made in
order to ha vP his ·execution but only needs to file a
preci p(' in which he recites tlw an1ount actually due
under the judg1nent. When this is filed with the Clerk
of the Court the ClPrk then makes a \Vrit of Execution
based upon the precipe. See 21 A1nerican .Jurisprudence
~f'(•t ion 44, Page 35, which statPs:
"A \Vrit of Execution is usually iss1wd upon pre(•ipP of the judg1nent creditor."
LikewisP instalhnents ordered to be paid under a
divorce decree which have become due and are unpaid
are stated in a precipe 1nade hy the plaintiff or her
counsel, and based upon the precipe's recital of the
amount due, unpaid and owing, the Clerk of the Court
issues the \Vrit of Execution. The a1nount due under
any judgment is equally uncertain because of payments
1nade by judg1nent debtor and interest accrued and
no 1nore error would likely occur in calculating the accrued interest and the balance due under a promissory note judgment than under a monthly support money
judgment particularly where, as in this case, all paym·ents 1nade hy the defendant Boyle were paid through
the Clerk of the Court. (See question and answer to
interrogatories before commissioner to establish basis
for judgn1ent.)
Attorneys often file an affidavit or petition reciting
a delinquency and asking judg1nent thereon, but ordinarily use the affidavit or petition only as a basis for an
Order to Show Cause to bring the defendant before the
Court and through pressure of contempt try to get him
to pay and not primarily to establish a judgment subse11
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quent to the divorce decree fixing the an1ount due.
The claimant Baggs may atten1pt to read into the
Beesley and Openshaw eases a need for the plaintiff
holding a divorce decree to return to Court and ·establish
the amount due in some subsequent judgment before
she is eligible for a \Vrit of Execution and before any
lien attach'es; reasoning that since Mrs. Openshaw filed
an application for a "\Vrit of Execution that thi~ proced-ure is necessary before execution could issue on accrued
unpaid support 1noney. The Court in the Openshaw case,
supra, said that it was proper for the plaintiff to follow
that procedure. (See lower half of page 530). However,
plaintiff's counsel in that situation was doubtless
prmnpted hy many considerations to ask for such a
judgment. Some of the1n were that more than eight
years had elapsed since the entry of the Decree, from
1932 to 19-H, and items 1nay haYe been in dispute and
as c·lain1ed by thr• defendant, the plaintiff had Inislead
him into a situation of laches. Also it was obs·erved
that the plaintiff in the Openshaw case filed in eonjunction with her request for a judg1nent fixing the
amount delinquent and due, an Order to Show Cause
citing the defendant for conte1npt. Rule 69B, which
is based on Sec. 104-37-~ U.C.A. 1943 referred to in the
Openshaw case, does not require that the precipe requesting the
ri t of Execution state that the a1nount due
thereunder, has been frcshJ~T dPereed hy the Court, since
the amount actnaJI~· due under an installment support decree or an ordinm·~· money judgment Yaries frmn day to
day as paynwnts arc made and inter0st aeerues. So that
it would he foolish for the plaintiff to run to the Court
periodically to fix the amount due under the judg1nent
before execution could issue• tlwreon.

"T
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The following cases are authorities for the position
that the plaintiff 'vife need not return to Court and obtain a new or second judgment in order to have a lien.
KEPIIAR'r v~. JCEPHART, 193 F2, G77. This is
a 19;"">1 (·a~e in the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of
Cohunbia Circuit. A divorce in 1936 ordered the defendant to pay $75.00 per month for the support of the
wife and two daughter:-;. Smne 15 years passed by without the plaintiff heing able to collect much money. She
then filed a l\[otion to have the defendant held in contempt of Court and a .Motion asking judgment against
hiln for the instalhnents due and unpaid. The Court
at the hottmn of Page 678, paragraph 2, asks the question
in this language:
.. Is a derree directing future payment of alimony
in itself a "1noney ;judg1nent", either originally
or with respect to each inHtalhnent as it hecon1es
due; or is there no enforceable judgment for
money in the wife's favor until, after the accrual
of installment:-;, an additional decree has been
entered awarding judgment thereon, pursuant
to her motion therefor accompanied by a showing of the amount which has become due and
which has not been paid~"
and answers that question in the following languages at
the bottmn of the left hand column of Page 681, as
follows:
"For reasons which will app'ear later, we hold
that an award of alimony is a judgment for
1noney, on which rxerntion may issue. It is perhaps convenient, and certainly not in1proper, for
the Court to enter a new judgment establishing
of record the accrued installm'ents which are unpaid, when the wife draws the facts to the court's
attention. But that ]Jroccd 11 re is not essential.
13
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Installments which have become due are easily
calculated from the terms of the original decree
and a look at the calendar. The wife's application
for a writ of execution accmnpanied hy her affidavit as to non-payment should nwve the issuance of the writ; if an issue is raised concerning
the an1ount due, the court can determine it."
(Italics ours)
The Court com1nents upon the rights under alimony
payments payable in future installments as follows at
the bottmn of the left hand colu1nn on page 684:
"We conclude, therefore, that the District
Court here cannot modify or re1nit installments
of alimony after they have becmne due hy the
terms of the original judgn1ent which ordered
their payment. When a decree award::; alilnony
payable in future installn1ents, the right to each
instalhnent becmnes absolute and vested when
it becmne:-; due, provided no nwdification of the
decree had been n1ade prior to it~ Inaturity. Each
installment which 1natures under a decree which
has not been n1odified becomes a judg1nent delJt
Rimi]ar to any other judgment for 1110ney. rrhe
original decree i:-; final in eharacter with respect
to each 1natured instalhnent and so eannot be
ehallenged here and should not be challenged
elsewhere. Execution nmy i~:-;ue upon it. It is
therefore unnecessary to seek in the original
action a .. nwney judg1nent". although, upon a
showing· made to the eourt of the mnount of the
matured instalhnent~ whieh ren1ain unpaid, it is
not improper for the District Court to note of
record the mnount which i~ then due under the
original judgment.''
SNOW v:-;. SNOW. 177 Southern, 793. In this case
the wife obtained a divorce and was allowed alilnony
in the sum of $+0.00 per month for herself and $20.00
14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

per month for her two (•hildren. Delinquency accrued
and Hhe fi1<·<l a petition to have the amount of the past
dun alimony determined and fixed, in order that she
might lutYP the jndgnwnt executed.
'rhP dPfendant, father, set up several defenses to
this petition, including her refusal to let him see the
child, the lack of adequate earnings to pay the judgment
and asked that he he relieved of past due alimony. His
counsel referred to CO~IPTON vs. AIRIAL, 9 La. Ann.,
496. 'rhe Court rejected the defendant's contention that
the ( iompton vs. Airial, supra, was authority for the
defendant':-~ contention and conunented on that case as
follows at the hottmn of the right hand column of page

197:
"Compton VH. Airial is not authority for the proposition, and in fact there is no authority for
the proposition, that a woman to whmn alimony
is due under a judgment against her husband
1nust first bring a proceeding such as this, and
have the mnount of the past due alimony deterlnined hy anoth'er judicial decree, before she can
have execution issued on the original decree condemning the husband to pay the alimony."
The Court further states at the middle of th'e left
hand column of page 800 in this case as follows:
"First, that, generally speaking, where a
decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in future instalments, the right to such instalments becomes absolute and vested upon becmning due, and is therefore protected by the full
faith and credit clause, pTovided no n1odification
of the decree has been made prior to the maturity
of the instahnents, since, as declared in the
Barber Case, 'alin1ony decreed to a wife in a
divorce or separation from bed and board is as
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much a debt of record until the decree has heen
'
. '"
recalled, as any other judgn1ent
for money 1~.
The appellate Court concluded that the District
Court was right in maintaining that they had no authority to release the defendant frmn his deht for past due
installments of alimony as aRked by the defendant.
STEELE v. STEELE, 239 P 2, 63. A California
case, 1952. In this case the Decree called for $75.00 per
1nonth which was reduced to $65.00 per 1nonth. The
plaintiff filed an affidavit in which she averred that
$909.93 wa~ past due and in arrears and without notice
to the defendant a writ of execution issued. The Court
on the defendant's 1notion recalled the writ, reduced the
paym'ents to $50.00 per 1nonth and ordered the defendant
to pay $10.00 per month on the delinquency. The plaintiff appealed and the Order which permitted the defendant to pay the delinquency at the rate of $10.00 per
month was r'eversecl, the court holding that the plaintiff
had an absolute right to have the writ of execution issued
and levied, the court statinp; at page 64:
,.rrhe plaintiff to a diYorre action is entitled to an
execution as to unpai<l installments of a snpport
award that haY<' accrued within five years of the
date of the application on an ex parte application
though it he made 1nore than five years after
tlw entry of tlw d0rree or ordt•r making tlw
award."
The following ra~<'s have affirnwd the Steele v.
Steele (;asP:
WOLF.,J1J v~. \YOLFJ,~. 180 Parific :.?, :~-1-:>.
1\Il LLA HD vs. l\riLLAHD, :.?:.?1 Pacific :.?, 4-71
DI <1( )RPO vs. DI COR PO, 200 Pacific :.?, 3:.?!).
The ( 1ourt's attention is directed to a rather lengthy
discussion of the proble1ns existing in the present case
16
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under the annotation ALIMONY OR SUPPORT DEC'RER -- Lll~ N, i11 50 ALR 2, 651. In tlw case cited
under d i~<·H~sion .Jonp:-; v ..Jono~, a lirn was impressed
on the fat hrr's intere~t in eertain real estate by langnag<' in the dl'<'I'P<> itself, so that rasP is not a point here,
hnt beginning- nnder NPdion 10, pagP 674, the Court
· there di sells~<·d "~fatu n•d or past-due instalhnents as
Iirn," and :. .:fated:
"[n :t nmul,<•r of cases it has been express}~' hel<l
that under statutes subjecting decrees for ali1nony
or support to the rules applicable to ordinary
judglll<'ll ts a dreree for periodical payments for
support n1oney or ali1nony constitutes a lien as to
matured or past due and unpaid installments."
The demurrer in the Beesley case supra to the plaintiff's complaint was sustained for as the Court points
out at Page 4;jg:
1

"There are no allegations in the cmnplaint of
and default in th'e payment of any installments
of the decreed alimony or that there was due any
due or unpaid when the .complaint was filed; nor
is there otherwise any breach of the divorce decree alleged * ·" * "
It was Mrs. Beesley's inability to allege a delinquency
which resulted in th'e defendant's Demurrer being sustained.
A divorce decree awarding support money differs
fron1 a lump sum 1noney judgment only in that it is
payable in monthly installments. In both judgments an
award of n1oney is 1nacle to the plaintiff, which if not
paid, is a lien against any real property of the defendant. To ascertain what a1nount is due requires a
look at the calendar to see what installments have accrued under the divorce decree and to see what interest
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has accrued. This is also true under an ordinary n1oney
judgment. Then inquiry is made of the judgment creditor to see if it has been paid in full or in part and a
lien exists for the sums accrued and unpaid.

POINT 3.
NOTICE TO TI-IE CLAIMANT BUYER WAS
ADEQUA'"PE TO PUT TI-IEM: ON A DUTY OF IXQUIRY.
The purpose of entering and docketing a judgment so far as the examiner of abstracts is concerned is to advise the exan1iner of the 'existance of the
judgment and to put the buyer on notice of that judgment. r:rhe buyer or his counsel is then required to asc'ertain whether or not the judgment is outlawed by the
statute of lirnitations, whether or not it is paid but not
satisfied of record, or partially paid and what sums are
presently due thereunder. This is true whether it is a
prmnissory note jndgnwnt or a decree providing for
future installments of support money. Except by satisfaction of the judgnwnt which rernoves the question entirely or h~· the statute of lirnitations running agaim;;t
some judgm'ent, the mnount due thereunder, whether
an ordinary rnoney judgrnent or an instalhnent support
rnoney judgmnt, is not known to the abstract exarniner
and the records do not r0v0al the facts necessary to ascertain the preci~e amount then due under the judgment.
'rhe respondents, Baggs, were advised by their legal
f•ounsel that there was a judgment lien for alirnony and
support rnoney against George .A. Boyl'e, Jr., which constituted a cloud on the title to said real property. (See
paragraph 11 of Plaintiff and Appellant's petition, which
allegations are deemed admitted for the purpose of this.
18
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~lotion

to Di:·nniss.)

In 'eitlwr ease the Clrrk of the Court has to rely
upon the ealenlations or state1nents by the plaintiff when
he files hi~ prr<·ipe in whieh he states the mnount due
under the ju<lgmrnt as ealeulated hy hint, a~ a basis for
the issnanre of a writ of ex'ecution.
\Vhat <loP~ any prospective purchaser of real propdo when he is advised that tlw seller has a recorded
judgment against hi1n? He proeePds to find out what
has been paid ~ineP the judg1nent was entered. Where
does he go to find the answer to these questions~ Is the
judgment outlawed by the statute of lin1itations? Is
the judgment pai(l hut not satisfied of record? Has the
;judg1nent been a~~igned~ What portion of the principle
is still due? What is the amount of the accrued interest~
Is the judg1nent creditor ·still alive? What sums does
the judg1nent creditor claim are still du'e under the
judgment?
If the judgment is not outlawed by the statute of
limitations or released then the prospective purchaser
must 1nake inquiry beyond th'e record to learn the statu3
of that judg1nent. He n1ust contact the plaintiff's attorney of record or try to find the judgment creditor and
otherwise infonn himself of the sums due claimed under
the judgment. In an ordinary money judgm'ent a lump
smn is fixed and the mnount due thereunder varie8 as
payments are rnade and interest accrues. Under support
1noney judgn1ents the 1nonthly amount is certain and as
the months pass the record reveals that a sum certain
has accrued. The inquiry in both judgments is the same.
Has the n1oney been paid·?

Prt~·

:\n exmnination of the Court file in the case of
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Boyle v. Boyle revealed that an Order directing payment of $5.00 per month on delinquent support payments
was entered, although the a1nount of the delinquency is
missing from the Court's order. (See paragraph No.4 of
plaintiff and appellant's petition). The alimony payment
ledger kept hy the County Clerk would reveal the payInents 1nade hy the defendant George A. Boyle, Jr., (See
plaintiff and appellant's answer to interrogatories on
deposition before a cmnmission) in which she answers
that all payments 1nade hy the defendant George A.
Boyle, .Jr., were n1ade through the Clerk of the Court.
A call to the plaintiff and appellant's counsel would have
revealed sun1s due under th'e judgment.
The respondents, Baggs, apparently disregarded
the advice of counsel and without any inquiry into the
matter elected to purchase th'e property frmn the defendant, George A. Boyle, .Jr. The respondents, Baggs,
are not hona fide purchasers for value, having disregarded counsel's advice regarding the title, and having
1nade no inquiry concerning the payments made under
the support n1oney judgment.
The right of 1ninor children to collect fron1 their
divorced father the support awarded to th'mn by the
Court would see1n to be a decree carrying with it such
social and welfare considerations, that it would be entitled to every reasonable interpretation that would aid
in attaining the purposes for which it wa~ entered, that
is, the full pa~nnent of the sums therein required to be
paid.
Respondents and Clainw.nts having been advised
by their counsel that this judgn1ent constituted a lien
and cloud on the title should now be precluded frmn re- 20
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ga1n1ng the funds which they paid on the purchase
contract inas1nuch as they disregarded the risk they
were advised existed at the time of purchase.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the appellant respectfully submits
that the authorities sustain her position that a judgment
calling for installment payments of support money became a lien on the property of the said George A. Boyle,
.Jr., after the same accrued and were unpaid without any
new or subsequent proceeding to fix the amount due
thereunder and that her petition should be granted and
funds held by the Clerk of the Court sufficient to cover
her judgment and accrued interest be ordered released
to her.
Respectfully subrnitted,
GLENN W. ADAMS
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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